In this paper, the classical theory of two-person cooperative games is extended to two-person cooperative games with interval uncertainty. The core, balancedness, superadditivity and related topics are studied. Solutions called ψ α -values are introduced and characterizations are given. Some economical situations with an interval character are considered.
Introduction
Classical cooperative game theory deals with coalitions who coordinate their actions and pool their winnings. One of the problems is how to divide the rewards or costs among the members of the formed coalition. Generally, the situations here are considered from a deterministic point of view. For further information about classical cooperative game theory the reader is referred to the books by Branzei et al. (2005) and Tijs (2003) . However, in most economical situations potential rewards or costs are not known precisely, but often it is possible to estimate intervals to which they belong. In Yager and Kreinovich (2000) an algorithm for fair division under interval uncertainty is presented using the work on interval analysis by Moore (1979) . Cooperative games arising from bankruptcy situations with interval uncertainty, called (cooperative) interval games, were introduced and analyzed by Branzei et al. (2003) and Branzei et al. (2004) . In a classical bankruptcy situation a certain amount of money (estate) has to be divided among some people (claimants) who have individual claims on the estate, and the total claim is weakly larger than the estate (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985) , Curiel et al. (1987) , O'Neill (1982) ). When the estate and/or the claims may belong to intervals of real numbers we have bankruptcy situations under interval uncertainty. In Carpente et al. (2005) a method is proposed to associate a coalitional interval game to each strategic game. Throughout the above literature we can find motivations, from different points of view, for the study of interval games. Here, a cooperative interval game is defined as an ordered pair < N, w > where N is the set of players, and w is the characteristic function which assigns to each coalition S a closed interval w(S) in R. We introduce the notion of the core set of a cooperative interval game and various notions of balancedness. Then we focus on two-person (cooperative) interval games and extend to these games well-known results for classical two-person cooperative games. Moreover, we define and analyze specific solution concepts on the class of two-person interval games, such as the mini-core set and the ψ α -values. The mini-core set is determined by considering the upper bound of the worths of the one-player coalitions in the two-person case. If a mini-core allocation is proposed, then no one-player coalition has any incentive to split off from the grand coalition for each selection of the interval games. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall basic definitions and results on balancedness for classical cooperative games. In Section 3 we introduce some definitions for n-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty and focus on balancedness. Section 4 deals with two-person interval games and their solutions: balancedness, the mini-core set and its relation with the core set, the ψ α -values and their axiomatic characterizations. We conclude in Section 5 with some remarks on further research.
Preliminaries on classical games in coalitional form
We give in the following some definitions and a theorem concerning classical games in coalitional form. For an extensive description of classical games in coalitional form see Tijs (2003) and Branzei et al. (2005) . A cooperative n-person game in coalitional form is an ordered pair < N, v >, where N = {1, 2, ..., n} (the set of players) and v : 2 N → R is a map, assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2 N a real number, such that v(∅) = 0. This function v is called the characteristic function of the game, v(S) is called the worth (or value) of coalition S. Often we identify a game < N, v > with its characteristic function v. The set G N of coalitional games with player set N forms with the usual operators of addition and scalar multiplication of functions a (2 |N | −1)-dimensional linear space; a basis of this space is supplied by the unanimity games u T (or < N, u T >), T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, which are defined by
One can easily check that for each v ∈ G N we have
The core of a game (cf. Gillies (1953) ) is a central set-valued solution concept in game theory. The core of a game < N, v > is the set
If x ∈ C(v), then no coalition S = N has any incentive to split off if x is the proposed reward allocation in N , because the total amount i∈S x i allocated to S is not smaller than the amount v(S) which the players can obtain by forming the subcoalition. For a two-person game < N, v >,
Here e S is the characteristic vector for coaliton S with
A collection B of coalitions is called a balanced collection if there is a balanced map λ such that
The importance of this notion becomes clear in the following theorem proved by Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) . This theorem characterizes games with a non-empty core.
Theorem 2.1. Let < N, v > be an n-person game. Then the following two assertions are equivalent:
Let π(N ) be the set of all permutations σ : N → N . The set P σ (i) = {r ∈ N |σ −1 (r) < σ −1 (i)} consists of all predecessors of i with respect to the permutation σ. Let v ∈ G N and σ ∈ π(N ). The marginal vector m σ (v) ∈ R n with respect to σ and v has as i-th coordinate m
The Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1967) ) is one of the most interesting onepoint solution concepts in classical cooperative game theory. The Shapley value associates to each n-person game one (payoff) vector in R n . The Shapley value Φ(v) of a game v ∈ G N is the average of the marginal vectors of the game, i.e.
Marginal vectors of a two-person game < N, v > are
and
For a two person game < N, v > we have
Note that for a two-person game < N, v >, the Shapley value is the standard solution which is in the middle of the core and the marginal vectors are the extreme points of the core whose average gives the Shapley value.
with S ∩ T = ∅. In a superadditive game it is advantageous for the players to cooperate. 
Cooperative games under interval uncertainty
In the following we will develop a theory of cooperation under interval uncertainty, inspired by the classical cooperative game theory (cf. Branzei et al. (2005) and Tijs (2003)). A cooperative n-person interval game in coalitional form is an ordered pair < N, w > where N := {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, and w : 2 N → I(R) is the characteristic function which assigns to each coalition S ∈ 2 N a closed interval w(S) ∈ I(R) where I(R) is the set of all closed intervals in R such that w(∅) = [0, 0]. For each S ∈ 2 N , the worth set (or worth interval ) of the coalition S in the interval game, w(S), is a closed interval which will be denoted by [w(S), w(S)], where w(S) is the lower bound and w(S) is the upper bound of w(S). Note that if all the worth intervals are degenerate intervals, i.e., w(S) = w(S), then the interval game < N, w > corresponds to the classical cooperative game < N, v > where v(S) = w(S).
Let < N, w > be an interval game; then v : 2 N → R is called a selection of w if v(S) ∈ w(S) for each S ∈ 2 N . We denote the set of selections of w by Sel(w). The imputation set of an interval game < N, w > is defined by
The core set of an interval game < N, w > is defined by
C(w) = ∅ if and only if there exists a v ∈ Sel(w) with C(v) = ∅. The family of all interval games with player set N is denoted by IG N . If all the worth intervals of an interval game w ∈ IG N are degenerate intervals, then I(w) = I(w) = I(w) and C(w) = C(w) = C(w). Note that v(S) ∈ w(S) is a real number, but w(S) = [w(S), w(S)] is a degenerate interval which is a set consisting of one point. An interval game < N, w > is strongly balanced if for each balanced map λ it holds that λ(S)w(S) ≤ w(N ). The family of all strongly balanced interval games with player set N is denoted by BIG N .
Proposition 3.1. Let < N, w > be an interval game. Then, the following three statements are equivalent:
(i) For each v ∈ Sel(w) the game < N, v > is balanced.
(ii) For each v ∈ Sel(w), C(v) = ∅.
(iii) The interval game < N, w > is strongly balanced.
Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii) follows from Theorem 2.1. (i) ⇔ (iii) follows using the inequalities
It follows from Proposition 3.1 that for a strongly balanced game < N, w >, C(w) = ∅ since for all v ∈ Sel(w), C(v) = ∅. We call an interval game < N, w > strongly unbalanced, if there exists a balanced map λ such that λ(S)w(S) > w(N ). Then, C(v) = ∅ for all v ∈ Sel(w), which implies that C(w) = ∅. If all the worth intervals of an interval game < N, w > are degenerate intervals then strongly balancedness corresponds to balancedness and strongly unbalancedness corresponds to unbalancedness in classical cooperative game < N, v >.
On two-person cooperative games under interval uncertainty 4.1 Balancedness and related topics
We simply use w(1), w(2) and w(1, 2) instead of w({1}), w({2}) and w({1, 2}). Let < N, w > be a two-person interval game. Then, we define:
(i) the pre-imputation set
(ii) the imputation set
Notice that for two-person interval games the imputation set and the core set are equal. Moreover, if an interval game is strongly balanced then its mini-core set is nonempty and it is a subset of the core set of the game. The next example is intended to give insight into the core set and mini-core set of a two person (strongly balanced) game < N, w >.
In Figure 1 , the mini-core set and the core set are depicted. Figure 1 : The mini-core set and the core set of a strongly balanced game This is a strongly balanced game since w(1)+w(2) = 3+5 ≤ w(1, 2) = 10. Now, we describe the core set and the mini-core set of a two-person interval game in terms of its selections. Let
and denote by w s 1 ,s 2 ,t the selection of w corresponding to s 1 , s 2 and t. Then,
Furthermore,
The mini-core set M C(w) is interesting because for each s 1 , s 2 and t all points in M C(w) with x 1 + x 2 = t are also in C(w s 1 ,s 2 ,t ). Note that all points in the mini-core set of w are individually rational points for each selection w s 1 ,s 2 ,t , and each selection w s 1 ,s 2 ,t can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games in the following way
Let A and B be two intervals. We say that A is left to B, denoted by A≺B, if for each a ∈ A and for each b ∈ B, a ≤ b.
A two-person interval game < N, w > is called superadditive, if
where w(1) + w(2) = {s 1 + s 2 |s 1 ∈ w(1), s 2 ∈ w(2)} and t ∈ w(1, 2). If w ∈ IG {1,2} is a superadditive game, then for each s 1 , s 2 and t we have
Hence, a two-person interval game < N, w > is superadditive if and only if < N, w > is strongly balanced.
ψ
α -values and their axiomatization of ψ α -values
In this subsection optimism vectors will play a role.
, which we call the optimism vector, and w ∈ IG {1,2} . We define:
We are interested in maps κ : [a, b] → R 2 where [a, b] is a closed interval in R with properties:
In the following, we call such maps monotonic curves, and we denote by K(R 2 ) the set of all monotonic curves in R 2 . A map F : IG {1,2} → K(R 2 ) assigning to each interval game w a unique curve
is called a solution. We say that F : IG {1,2} → K(R 2 ) has the property of
2 (w) we have F (w)(t) 1 = F (w)(t) 2 ; (iii) covariance with respect to translations (COV), if for all
we have F (w +â)(a 1 + a 2 + t) = F (w)(t) + a.
Here,â ∈ IG {1,2} is defined bŷ
and w +â ∈ IG {1,2} is defined by (w +â)(s) = w(s) +â(s) for s ∈ {{1} , {2} , {1, 2}} .
For each w ∈ IG {1,2} and t ∈ [w(1, 2), w(1, 2)] we define the map Then, the characteristic function of the interval game is as follows:
This is a strongly balanced game, since w(1)+w(2) = 30+50 ≤ w(1, 2) = 100, ψ (0,0) (w)(t) = (10 + β, 30 + β) with β = 1 2 (t − 40) and t ∈ [100, 120]. Figure 2 illustrates that for all t ∈ [100, 120], ψ (0,0) (w)(t) ∈ M C(w (0,0,t) ); L in this figure denotes the set {ψ (0,0) (w)(t)|t ∈ [100, 120]}.
Then,
Note that
Theorem 4.1. The ψ α -value is the unique solution satisfying EFF, α-SYM and COV properties.
Proof. Suppose the solution F : IG {1,2} → K(R 2 ) satisfies the three properties above. We show that F = ψ α . Take w ∈ IG {1,2} and let a = (s
2 (w)). Then, s α (w −â) = (0, 0). By α-SYM and EFF, for eacht = t − a 1 − a 2 with t ∈ [w(1, 2), w(1, 2)] we have F (w −â)(t) = ( ) = ψ α (w −â)(t). Hence, F (w −â) = ψ α (w −â). By COV of F and ψ α we obtain F (w)(t) = F (w −â)(t) + a = ψ α (w −â)(t) + a = ψ α (w)(t) for each w ∈ IG {1,2} and t ∈ [w(1, 2), w(1, 2)]. From Proposition 4.1 it follows that ψ α satisfies EFF, α-SYM and COV. So, ψ α is the only solution with these three properties.
The marginal curves for a two-person game < N, w > are defined by 
Concluding remarks
It would be interesting to extend our results to n-person games under interval uncertainty and to study cooperation under interval uncertainty in different 
